Trump said negotiations "are going on right now". President Psycho mentioned "decapitating" Iran and said it was their "last chance".

U.S. President Donald Trump on Monday said Iran faced "decapitation" if it did not agree a pact to end the conflict between the two nations, saying Tehran had one last chance to strike a deal. "I think we're going to maybe get something, but I want to give them every last chance before decapitation," he said, reiterating a threat to launch a major attack on Iran. Earlier on Monday, after Iran said there were no talks under way, Trump slammed what he called Iran's "unbelievably duplicitous" leadership.

Trump, asked about the status of the negotiations, told reporters "they are going on right now," adding that the two sides were speaking at the request of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar among others. "This is a last chance for them to sign a good document," he said, referring to Iran.

https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-iran-talks-are-going-on-right-now-tehran-has-one-last-chance

This Bluesky thread has more dialog snippets - https://bsky.app/profile/chadbourn.bsky.social/post/3ms724gggok2j

The only interesting part of the "missing chapter of the 2024 DNC autopsy report" that the NYT published today is the general election voter shift from 2020->2024. They did it, they got more votes from wealthy white suburban voters!

https://archive.ph/XxwV8

Oman is cozying up to China as US throws Mideast into disarray

The war in Iran is pushing smaller states to diversify their great power partnerships — if Washington will let them

::: spoiler more

Earlier this month, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Miao Deyu met with Omani National Security Council Secretary-General Idris Abdulrahman Al Kindi. The pair reaffirmed support for each other’s core interests, discussed deepening cooperation between the Belt and Road Initiative and Oman Vision 2040, and talked about regional security issues. During the visit, Al Kindi also met with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official Jin Xin. Both sides expressed interest in expanding bilateral exchanges and cooperation, while Oman said it hopes to learn from the CCP’s governance experience and strengthen collaboration in trade, investment, industrial parks, and tourism. The meeting was notable for the level of representation. The participation of Oman’s National Security Council secretary-general suggested that bilateral engagement is expanding beyond trade toward political and strategic consultation. It also sent clear messages to Beijing that China is becoming a broader strategic partner, and to Washington that Muscat intends to preserve its foreign policy independence. “Oman survives by ensuring that no single relationship can hold its sovereignty hostage,” said Hamed S. Al Ghaithi, senior research associate at Country Risk Solutions, in an interview with RS, noting that diversification of partnerships is the “oldest instinct in modern Omani statecraft.” “What the war has done is convert a preference into a necessity,” he said.

As tensions with Washington rise and the fallout from the Iran war reverberates across the Middle East, Oman is seeking greater strategic autonomy by diversifying its international partnerships. Its expanding relationship with China is a critical part of that agenda, as Muscat seeks to gain greater flexibility without abandoning its longstanding security ties with the United States. At stake is a fundamental question about the extent to which the U.S. will show flexibility to smaller states that seek to navigate among competing centers of power in an increasingly multipolar world rather than align exclusively with Washington. Oman, known for its independent foreign policy, has long balanced relations among regional states and global powers, embracing the role of a neutral mediator and partner. It is not seeking a grand pivot away from the West. But it is hoping to preserve strategic autonomy and strengthen its resilience in an increasingly multipolar world. Within this context, Oman’s relationship with China warrants particular attention.

Diversifying without realignment

Recent events have reinforced Omani concerns about excessive dependence on Washington. Particularly concerning from Oman’s point of view were the Trump administration’s decision to sabotage Omani-facilitated diplomacy with Tehran in late February by launching a reckless war on Iran, as well as Trump’s subsequent threat to “blow up” Oman amid reports that Muscat was in talks with Tehran about imposing a joint toll on the Strait of Hormuz. “From Muscat’s perspective, a country that has acted for decades as a reliable mediator and maintained constructive relations with Washington should not be publicly threatened merely because it refuses to surrender its independent foreign policy,” said an Omani geopolitical analyst who spoke to RS on the condition of anonymity. “Oman is therefore likely to deepen relations not only with China, but also with European powers, India, Russia, and other Asian states. The objective is not to replace one dependency with another. It is to create a wider network of economic, diplomatic, technological, and security partnerships that gives Oman greater room to maneuver,” he explained, adding that a “more openly multipolar Omani foreign policy” could become the outcome. “Oman’s neutrality and mediation role will remain central, but Muscat may become more assertive in defending its sovereignty and less willing to accommodate pressure to choose sides.” Oman generally avoids dramatic realignments. Instead, Muscat is seeking to expand relationships incrementally, preserving longstanding Western security ties while deepening diplomatic, economic and political engagement with China and other Asian partners. “Oman is not exchanging one patron for another,” said Al Ghaithi. “It is redistributing risk so that it never again faces a moment where a single capital can dictate its choices.”

The broadening China-Oman partnership

While energy remains the foundation of Sino-Omani relations, the partnership is likely to broaden into more investment and partnerships in logistics, manufacturing, renewable energy, and digital infrastructure, reflecting the alignment between Oman Vision 2040 and China’s connectivity ambitions. As a credible and effective intermediary in the Middle East, Oman pursues a diplomatic approach to regional security dilemmas that gives Beijing ample reason to view Muscat as a valuable partner. As China constantly works to build up its image as a champion of political dialogue and international law, as well as a constructive stakeholder in the Middle East, Beijing and Muscat’s cooperation stands to extend into new domains including crisis management, maritime governance, and the facilitation of post-conflict regional diplomacy. That both countries, along with Iraq, used their diplomatic leverage to help bring Saudi Arabia and Iran to renormalization of formal relations in March 2023 underscored such synergies between Oman and the Asian giant. “China and Oman share an interest in preventing the Strait of Hormuz from becoming either a battlefield or an instrument of political coercion. China requires uninterrupted energy flows, while Oman requires stability, freedom of navigation and respect for the sovereignty of the states bordering the Strait. This creates a strong basis for maritime and diplomatic coordination,” the Omani analyst told RS. “China may also find Oman useful as a diplomatic bridge. Oman maintains experience in mediation and communication with parties that often refuse to speak directly to one another. China, meanwhile, seeks to present itself as a supporter of diplomatic settlements and a significant political actor in the Middle East. Cooperation between the two countries could therefore extend into conflict de-escalation, maritime arrangements and post-war regional dialogue,” he added. Bilateral cooperation is also likely to expand in areas like maritime security coordination, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, military education, intelligence exchanges on non-traditional threats, and limited defense procurement in areas where Chinese systems offer practical advantages. However, such cooperation is likely to remain confined within clear boundaries. Muscat favors selective diversification on security issues rather than alliance commitments or permanent military basing.

Balancing great powers without choosing sides

Oman’s longstanding defense relationships with the U.K. and U.S. make it highly unlikely that China will replace Western partners as Muscat’s principal security guarantor. Instead, recent regional instability has reinforced Oman’s preference for balanced partnerships that preserve strategic autonomy while expanding its diplomatic and economic options. Muscat will take necessary steps to avoid too much economic dependence on China, which could undermine the Sultanate’s sovereignty. This balancing strategy reflects a broader Omani view that strategic autonomy depends not on choosing one external partner over another, but on maintaining the flexibility to work with multiple powers while protecting national interests. “Oman is the test case for whether small states can preserve multi-alignment in a bifurcating order and whether the United States can tolerate partners rather than merely clients,” Al Ghaithi said. “If the current pressure succeeds in forcing Oman to choose, Washington will not gain a more obedient ally; it will lose the region’s most useful diplomatic instrument, and China will inherit, at no cost, a partnership Americans spent two centuries building.” “The question worth asking is not whether Oman is drifting toward China, but why American policy is doing so much of the pushing.” :::

Trump: "(SoH) will be opened literally by tomorrow. Completely open"

[edit] A bit later he said this is "Iran's last chance". My guess is that nothing happens tomorrow.

CBS: No new negotiations planned despite Trump comments, per U.S. officials.

CENTCOM is asking if you have any ideas how they could still win this ? .

Zero Twitter/DuckDuckGo/Google results for "the united states wall of steel" before today. He's still got it.

Burkina Faso expands budget as mining reforms boost state revenues

The lack of any kind of :traore: emoji remains a stain on Hexbear. Anyways, the new mining strategy in BF is pretty impressive and working out great for the country. There's two major sides to the strategy.

::: spoiler First, the nationalization and domestication of large-scale industrial mines

Then, on its quest for economic sovereignty, his government, among other measures, set the dormant Burkina Faso Mining Participation Company (SOPAMIB) into motion later that year to expand state ownership of mining. By the end of 2025, six of the country’s 15 industrial mines, accounting for 40% of the national mining operations, were domestically owned – three directly by the state, and the remaining three by Burkinabe private companies.​

Cashing in on the gold price rally last year, Burkina Faso repaid over two billion dollars in domestic debt. Earlier in May, it also established the Burkina Faso Sovereign Mining Investment Fund (FSMIB).​

Financed by surpluses generated when international mineral prices rise above the benchmark set by the state, the FSMIB is ring-fenced for long-term strategic infrastructural and industrial projects, reducing dependence on external funding.​ :::

By bringing a big chunk of these mines under Burkinabe control, the state's been able to create a huge budget windfall that's even allowed the development of a sovereign wealth fund, a massively valuable tool for self-directed investment.

::: spoiler Just as interesting is part two: the organization and formalization of artisanal miners, which produce more than the industrial mines

This was made possible by mining reforms, which, alongside increasing state participation and domestic ownership, have brought artisanal miners into formal networks. Historically, artisanal mining has been informal. Miners sold the gold to smugglers who paid the international spot price in cash. Tons would thus cross borders, with no paper trail, no taxes, and no yield to the national economy beyond sustaining the meagre livelihoods of the artisanal miners.​

To bring the gold they mine into the official channels while also protecting and formalizing their livelihood, the government has delineated four mining corridors exclusively for artisanal miners, who have historically been in conflict with industrial mining companies. It has also set up nine cooperatives for artisanal miners.​

The 29 tons of gold the National Precious Substances Company (SONASP) procured from them in the first half of this year was already 64% of its annual target of 45 tons. Accounting for a record high of 40% of Burkina Faso’s national output, artisanal gold production surpassed the 26 tonnes produced by the country’s industrial mines.​

Together, the 55 tons, worth six billion dollars, is almost 25% higher than the production in the first half of last year. Industrial production grew by 7.5%. Production by artisanal and semi-mechanized miners grew by 45%.​ :::

The state is socializing the benefits of already centralized mining systems AND formalizing, organizaing, and strengthening existing decentralized systems. Sounds a little like socialism to me

https://archive.ph/aXEhw

Navy retiring USS Fort Worth halfway through lifespan

The $400 million littoral combat ship only entered service in 2012, but suffered from myriad operational problems and had less than two years at sea

::: spoiler more

This week, the Navy retired a littoral combat ship only halfway through its lifespan. The USS Fort Worth, a surface combatant ship which cost $400 million to build, entered service in 2012. It was originally meant to serve until the late 2030s, but was retired early due to chronic repair issues and related costs, and longstanding concerns regarding its overall viability. A major issue for the USS Fort Worth was its combining gear, which connects its gas turbine and engines to its water jet shafts. The combining gear took critical damage back in 2016 when crew members failed to follow proper procedures while testing its engines, rendering the boat functionally unusable. The Navy initially scheduled the USS Fort Worth’s retirement for 2022, after only ten years of service. However, the Navy repurposed the ship instead, using it to test new technologies at a port in San Diego. “By retiring early-hull test platforms like Fort Worth, the Navy redirects investments toward upgrading the remaining LCS inventory with enhanced capabilities,” the Navy said in a statement this week. Its retirement helps ensure “the active ships remain relevant, combat-credible, and reliable throughout their service lives.”

But, as Dan Grazier, the director of the Stimson Center’s National Security reform program, tells RS: “The whole Littoral Combat Ship concept has failed.” “It's a poorly designed ship that [has an] excessive maintenance burden,” Grazier said. To Grazier’s point, a 2022 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found the Navy “hasn’t demonstrated that this type of ship can perform its intended missions,” and that it was less likely than its counterparts to withstand combat. The USS Fort Worth’s untimely demise is representative of a broader procurement crisis, where the Navy has repeatedly failed to deploy reliable ships that can perform their intended function. Rather, as Grazier tells RS, the Navy has often opted to build elaborately designed ships with unproven technologies, which often do not work as planned. “The Navy's now feeling the real consequences of years of bad policy,” Grazier said. “The size of the fleet is shrinking.” The Navy originally planned to buy 55 littoral combat ships; it cut back to 32 in 2014 as questions mounted about the program’s viability. It now has 27. :::

The Guardian - Six Saudi-flagged supertankers have changed course in the Gulf of Aden in recent days amid threats from the Iran-aligned Houthis, Reuters reports. The tankers, which were empty of cargo after returning from destinations in Asia, opted to avoid transit through the southern Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint by sailing in formation toward southern Africa, according to automatic identification systems data collected by Reuters.

The Houthis of Yemen, who control the capital Sana’a and much of its Red Sea coastline, announced on 20 July that they were implementing a blockade against Saudi ships. They have since claimed to have been behind a number of strikes on Saudi tankers.

https://archive.ph/T7eU2

Key B-52 upgrades face cost, schedule risks: GAO

A new audit from the Government Accountability Office found concerns with the Air Force’s modernization of the B-52 Stratofortress, which is planned to fly through the middle of the century.

::: spoiler more

A host of upgrades meant to extend the life of the aging B-52 Stratofortress bombers face a number of cost and schedule risks, and officials aren’t properly using all tools at their disposal to shape the aircraft’s modernization, according to a new watchdog report. Collectively, the Air Force plans to spend roughly $21 billion on 13 different upgrades for the B-52, which will keep the Eisenhower-era bomber flying through the 2050s. But two key, expensive efforts — one to replace the aircraft’s eight engines, and another to swap out its radar — are “at risk for additional cost, schedule, and performance challenges,” the Government Accountability Office said in a report published today. The report found that the propulsion overhaul dubbed the Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP), which will switch out aging TF33 powerplants manufactured by Pratt & Whitney with modern Rolls-Royce F130 engines, is expected in 2033. That schedule is in line with previous estimates, but its expected cost has now swelled to $15.4 billion, approximately $400 million over the $15 billion projection previously shared by program officials. GAO notes that the cost growth for the CERP effort reflects an over 38 percent jump since 2018, which would normally have triggered a congressionally mandated notification known as Nunn-McCurdy — but didn’t in this case, because the program’s development has been delayed by nearly three years.

GAO found development is now slated to kick off in the third quarter of fiscal 2026, which ended in June. (In May, the Air Force announced CERP passed a critical design review, which typically comes after the start of development known in Pentagon parlance as Milestone B.) But GAO warned that CERP’s overall schedule is still at risk, especially as both engine production and developmental flight testing are set to begin in FY29. Doing both concurrently, the watchdog warned, could mean that unwelcome discoveries spur costly and time-intensive rework. The hasty schedule is largely driven by the need to replace the aircraft’s TF33 engines that will become increasingly difficult to sustain as years pass. Any further delays for the engine overhaul could have cascading effects, GAO noted. While the Air Force is expanding depot capacity, the service has not planned for CERP delays beyond 2031, which risks disrupting the careful choreography of regular maintenance work and various modernization efforts for the in-demand B-52 fleet. Additional CERP schedule slips could render the Air Force “unable to effectively sustain the current B-52 engines and could result in too few B-52s to support operational requirements,” GAO found.

Like with engines, the radar upgrade, dubbed the Radar Modernization Program (RMP) that will integrate an RTX sensor, has seen its own cost and schedule challenges. That program’s budget has ballooned 30 percent to over $2.9 billion — a number lower than a $3.3 billion estimate previously shared by officials, but still enough to previously trigger its own Nunn-McCurdy breach. Similar to prior schedule estimates, the Air Force anticipates RMP will be operational in the third quarter of FY30, three-and-a-half years later than originally expected. And it will come with its own risk of concurrency since production is planned to start with only two months of flight testing completed, out of 18 total planned. While the Air Force has implemented some cost and savings control measures, the service has also removed some unspecified performance requirements. GAO notes that “in this case, after contract award, the Air Force will receive less capability while paying more for the program.” The RMP effort also suffered a tragic setback in June when one of two flight test aircraft for the program crashed shortly after takeoff from Edwards Air Force Base in California, killing all eight crew on board. An Air Force official on Monday said that the program is focusing on supporting the mishap investigation, and will make schedule adjustments as necessary. Elsewhere, GAO noted that while some digital engineering is being used for the CERP program, the other 12 B-52 modernization efforts are not utilizing digital design tools in line with best practices. The dearth of digital engineering, GAO found, means “the Air Force may be missing opportunities to take advantage of efficiencies that digital engineering can provide, including avoiding future sustainment and supportability challenges.”

The watchdog identified organizational issues as well, including that the B-52 fleet is lacking one-third of the unique support equipment it needs. Compounding the problem, it said the Air Force lacks clear guidance on who exactly is responsible for the life cycle management of that equipment. Without that clarity, GAO warned “the Air Force will likely face additional maintenance challenges, which may, in turn, negatively affect the availability of B-52 for operational deployment.” Owing to woes like a lack of spare parts, the report notes that the B-52’s mission capable rates “have not improved” since a November 2022 assessment that found the aircraft was failing to meet benchmarks. However, GAO said in its report today that mission capable rates, schedules and availability for the B-52 were withheld since those details were deemed “sensitive” by the Defense Department. Today the Air Force did not respond by press time when asked for updates on the modernization schedule for the B-52. Both the CERP and RMP efforts are led by prime contractor Boeing, which also did not immediately respond to a request for comment. GAO issued a total of six recommendations, ranging from implementing digital engineering to figuring out who’s responsible for the B-52’s support equipment. The Air Force fully concurred with five, but only partially concurred with a recommendation to delay the CERP’s production decision until the service analyzes the impact of recent cost increases and schedule delays. :::

https://t.me/AMK_Mapping/35310

So Ukraine's post-Fedorov strategy appears to be bombing Wildberries warehouses en masse until Russia's treatlerites cry uncle. I think the count of destroyed warehouses is like 5 or 6 now.

I feel like it would be relatively easy to counter by simply decentralizing everything.

https://archive.ph/ub3DX

Why Hasn't Iran Sunk an American Aircraft Carrier?

And what's up with anti-ship ballistic missiles?

The Iran War has so far unfolded in a way that could be described as “predictable,” or obvious. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz was predicted by many, as were Iranian attacks on Gulf oil infrastructure. The asymmetry between modern ballistic missiles and ballistic missile defense was also known and predictable based on the performance of the Patriot in the war in Ukraine. Iranian ballistic missile performance specifically—and especially their ability to penetrate Israeli and American air defenses—was well known to anyone who closely observed Operation True Promise I in April 2024. The shortage of American standoff munitions and missile interceptors was publicly known before the war. The vulnerability of MALE drones could be predicted from observing the Red Sea Crisis. Even casual observers are well aware of the battlefield revolution Iranian drone designs have triggered in Ukraine. That American and Israeli air forces would fail to establish long-term, constant, and total control over Iranian skies could have been predicted by anyone who dug closely into Israeli air attacks on Iran in 2024, or, again, the war in Ukraine. There is, however, one glaring exception to this rule: that the Iranians have, apparently, failed to seriously damage an American naval vessel, and an aircraft carrier in particular. Given the impressive showing by Iranian missiles and the comparatively poor performance of American air defenses, this seems counterintuitive. If Iranian ballistic missiles have the capability to strike targets from hundreds of miles away with pinpoint accuracy, if they’re able to maneuver in flight, attain hypersonic terminal velocities, and penetrate the most modern and sophisticated air defenses in the world, why are American carrier strike groups able to loiter a few hundred kilometers from Iranian shores?

::: spoiler more

Before getting into the meat of this question, let’s get some caveats out of the way. The only thing we truly know, because it’s been confirmed in official statements by both sides, is that the Iranians have targeted US Navy assets. We don’t know if they’ve managed to hit an American ship, and there’s no strong evidence that they have, but we can be certain they haven’t sunk one. We don’t know how many anti-ship missiles and drones the Iranians have expended in their targeting efforts. We’ll avoid speculating on the possibility of American cover-ups of damage to naval vessels in this piece. We can't rule out that the Iranians are deliberately withholding a catastrophic strike. In this view, they could be limiting themselves to what are effectively warning shots to keep the American naval force in the Arabian Sea at a distance. This could make sense from a strategic perspective, as it would control the rate of escalation. Striking American bases in Jordan, for example, could plausibly be construed as lower on the Iranian escalation ladder than striking an American aircraft carrier, which is the enduring symbol of American military power. It’s long been speculated that the American government would be forced to respond to the sinking of an aircraft carrier with a retaliatory nuclear strike, though there is no evidence this is US military doctrine. What we’ll do in this piece is focus narrowly on why Iran might have a hard time hitting an American aircraft carrier, provided they were determined to do so. This is an important question, because a surface-level analysis might assume Iran’s startling ability to precisely hit static ground targets would translate to anti-ship operations. But this is not necessarily the case. To understand why, we’ll trace the history of anti-ship missile (ASM, sometimes AShM) development and the constraints of ballistic missile design.

Falling With Precision

First, it’s important to understand how the most basic form of ballistic missile functions. Ballistic missiles begin their trajectory with the “boost phase,” a powered phase that delivers all the kinetic energy the missile requires to reach its target. This is the phase in which guidance traditionally occurs, meaning the missile spends the majority of its ballistic arc falling unguided to its target. The missile’s guidance system contains accelerometers and gyroscopes. The guidance computer takes these inputs and compares them against the missile’s launch position and a predetermined, static target, finding the missile’s deviation from its desired track and correcting it using control surfaces like exhaust vanes, fins, and engine gimbals. This is called inertial navigation, and it dates all the way back to the German V-2 rocket, which used an analog computer. Inertial guidance systems are entirely self-contained. It emits nothing and receives no external signals. Therefore, it’s impossible to jam or spoof. It doesn’t require a complex seeker, and the basic technology it relies on has existed for nearly a century. But inertial guidance has drawbacks. The sensors involved are not perfect. Gyroscopes have drift, and accelerometers have bias. There are limits to how precisely a rocket motor can be switched off, and variance in the atmosphere and even gravity across the earth’s surface can introduce error. Decades of ballistic missile development have progressively reduced the error rate of inertial guidance systems. Missile accuracy is measured in “circular error probable,” or CEP, which is the radius of a circle drawn around the target in which 50% of the projectiles will land. The V-2 rocket had a CEP of around 15 kilometers, meaning that if the Germans fired 100 V-2s at a given target, 50 of them would land within a 15 km radius of it. This made it useful only for random terror bombings. Engineers attacked the weak points of inertial navigation systematically after the introduction of the V-2. Gyroscope quality has been improved, systems now account for the variation of gravity across the earth’s surface, launch points are surveyed with extreme precision (inertially guided submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or SLBMs, have never been as accurate because they’re launched from a mobile platform), and guidance computers are massively more sophisticated than the analog computers of the 1940s. By the 1960s, inertial guidance was more than sufficient to produce acceptable CEP for missiles used in countervalue strikes, with the massive damage radius of nuclear warheads. Modern inertial guidance systems are capable of achieving a CEP measured in the tens of meters, or even less. Radio-inertial, GPS, and stellar-inertial systems have been developed to supplement purely inertial guidance to improve accuracy.

The Problem With a Moving Target

But inertial guidance is wholly insufficient for striking a moving target. To demonstrate why, we can plot out a series of circles representing the distance an aircraft carrier can travel within a given timeframe while moving at 30 knots:

This diagram is deliberately simplified, and doesn’t account for the target’s heading, wind, the constraints of carrier operations, and so on, but it gives us a rough sense of the problem. Within five minutes of launch, the target could be potentially anywhere within an area the size of Manhattan. Within ten minutes, that area exceeds four Manhattans. By the time 20 minutes have passed, it’s 18 Manhattans, or a circle with the approximate width of the Strait of Hormuz’s narrowest point. A Nimitz-class aircraft carrier has a deck area of 0.02 square kilometers, or 0.027% of the 5-minute target area. Even with a missile capable of hitting a postage-stamp-sized target with consistency, it would be like trying to thrust one’s hand into a haystack and find a needle by sheer luck.

The First Attempt

The solution, then, is to introduce a seeker. The first serious attempt at this was Soviet, because the Soviets recognized the need to create a counter to American aircraft carriers. In the mid-1960s, the Soviets took the existing R-27 SLBM and developed a new terminal guidance system driven by a passive radar seeker. The resulting platform was dubbed the R-27K. And while the missile was successfully tested against a mobile target barge, it had severe limitations that would have prevented its operational use even if it weren’t constrained by the SALT treaty. These limitations elucidate the extreme complexity involved in designing an ASBM. The Soviet selection of a passive radar seeker for the R-27K was logical. A passive seeker simply detects a radar emission—it doesn’t have to generate its own radar signal, fire it off into the target area, and wait for it to return. The round trip of an active seeker imposes power and time constraints, and requires a complex transmitter (keep in mind all of these components have to fit inside the missile itself). The R-27K likely activated its passive seeker during the midcourse phase of flight, while it was outside the atmosphere. This bypassed the need to design a seeker capable of either transmitting or receiving through the plasma sheath that surrounds a ballistic missile during atmospheric re-entry, its terminal phase.

:::

cont'd in response, 1/4

Washington wildfires ‘worst disaster’ state has ever faced, says Spokane mayor

Climate collapse is hitting hard. Multiple large scale fires spurred on by strong winds. National guard mobilized.

Al-Mayadeen: Tehran says no talks with US underway, confirms Oman negotiations

Iran's Foreign Ministry said no US negotiations are underway, while bilateral talks with Oman continue over a temporary route through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran is not holding any negotiations with the United States at present, Foreign Ministry spokesperson and member of the Iranian negotiating team Esmaeil Baghaei said Monday, adding that Tehran's ongoing discussions with Oman are focused exclusively on establishing a temporary safe shipping route through the Strait of Hormuz.

Baghaei said Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi's recent regional contacts are aimed at addressing regional insecurity and protecting Iran's national interests, noting that all members of Iran's negotiating team are currently in the country.

Trump claims like the last 100 times over the previous months that Tehran is begging for a deal, while the IRGC continues targeting tankers violating their provisions and yesterday downed a US MQ-9 Reaper over the straight, definitely the actions of a people desperate to end the conflict

Before this thread gets started, just a quck reminder:

Death to America and its external zionist tumor. Liberation to all peoples across the world. Imperialism will fall and socialism will rise.

: ‘The U.S.A. is locked and loaded and ready to go against the Islamic Republic of Iran, at levels of Military Terror, Strength, and Power not seen since World War II. Despite this, we have just been asked by Iran, and other Middle Eastern Countries, to hold off any attack in that the perimeters of a deal has been agreed to. This would include the Immediate, Complete, and Total OPENING OF THE HORMUZ STRAIT, and an end to Iran's nuclear threat. Based on this request, I have agreed, for the future benefit of the WORLD and, likewise, the survival of a successful and prosperous Iran, to cancel the attack, subject to being able to rapidly make a DEAL. The Country of Israel joins me in this commitment. Get to work, everybody, and get it DONE. Thank you for your attention to this matter! President DONALD J. TRUMP.’

https://xcancel.com/EventsUkraine/status/2083611773815632375

WESTERN MEDIA CULPABILITY IN UKRAINIAN MASS CASUALTIES

Ukraine's assault units have lost thousands and thousands of men in largely pointless offensive operations. They routinely executed deserters and tortured subordinates to death. Who is to blame?

Some Ukrainian media blames commander-in-chief Syrsky. But he was just following orders from the political leadership. Zelensky gave the award Hero of Ukraine to all the most infamous commanders of the assault units. In fact, the assault units exist due to western desires. The western press and political class is always eager for 'Ukrainian advances'. The assault units have been able to deliver on this - they were the only units that enthusiastically participated in the 2024 Kursk invasion, which so titillated western audiences. 'Ukraine has shattered Russian military might through a genius operation'. And the assault units were able to retake a few villages this year, which gave rise to all sorts of claims about a 'southern counteroffensive' which has 'turned the tides of the war'. Kursk ended in a rout, with untold casualties. The southern counterattacks, according to Ukrainian military analysts and soldiers, also involve massive losses, all just to retake miniscule villages with pre-war population of under 10. But western audiences love it. And Zelensky knows he needs their attention. And only through torture and the real threat of death is it possible to force violently mobilized civilians to participate in such suicide missions. So even if the assault units are disbanded, I doubt their practices will go anywhere. Now will there be any punishment for those really responsible. The military commanders were just following orders, fulfilling the desires of western consumers.

First